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Abstract 
Regardless of technology benefits, safety planners still face difficulties explaining 
errors related to the use of different technologies and evaluating how the errors impact the 
performance of safety decision making. This paper presents a preliminary error impact 
analysis testbed to model object identification and tracking errors caused by image-based 
devices and algorithms and to analyze the impact of the errors for spatial safety assessment 
of earthmoving and surface mining activities. More specifically, this research designed a 
testbed to model workspaces for earthmoving operations, to simulate safety-related 
violations, and to apply different object identification and tracking errors on the data 
collected and processed for spatial safety assessment. Three different cases were analyzed 
based on actual earthmoving operations conducted at a limestone quarry. Using the testbed, 
the impacts of the errors were investigated for the safety planning purpose.  
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1. Introduction 
In construction industry, studies on the image-based object identification and 
tracking of on-site objects have become crucial since they facilitate automating site 
monitoring processes by providing dynamic information of construction resources and 
activities. Specifically for construction safety, the image-based object identification and 
tracking studies have employed the state-of-the-art technologies and customized methods 
and algorithms for real-time safety applications. For example, Chi et al. [1] developed a 
methodology for object identification and tracking based on spatial modeling and image 
matching techniques. Using spatial data acquired by a high-frame-rate imaging camera, a 
work zone model was built, matched with objects from the database for identification, and 
tracked within an image sequence. Cordova and Brilakis [2] presented an on-site vision 
tracking method of construction personnel using video cameras, which had advantages in 
detecting travel path conflicts and enhancing site safety. Teizer and Vela [3] evaluated 
performances of different worker tracking algorithms using video cameras for surveillance 
purposes. 
Regardless of the benefits of automated monitoring and assessment, safety planners 
still face challenges selecting applicable devices, methods and algorithms for safety 
assessment. This is due to the fact that (1) construction operations and sites are unique and 
complex, (2) such devices, methods, and algorithms typically have measurement and 
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processing errors and (3) the impact of the errors is different depending on workspaces. 
For example, Teizer et al. [4] indicated that the occupancy grid algorithm resulted in below 
11% in positioning errors, 18-22% in dimension measurement errors, and about 5% in 
moving speed estimation errors. They also revealed limitations due to the short range 
coverage and the noisy outdoor performance of 3D imaging cameras. As another example, 
Teizer and Vela [3] showed that several image-based tracking algorithms, including mean-
shift and Bayesian ones, used for worker tracking resulted in different tracking errors. 
Given these device, method, and algorithm errors and limitations, there is a need to 
develop methods to evaluate the impact of errors caused by algorithms and devices on the 
data collected and processed for safety assessment of specific construction operations. 
The primary purpose of this research is to develop methods to evaluate data 
collection and data processing errors of image-based devices and algorithms used on safety 
performance monitoring of a specific earthmoving activity or project. The main compelling 
reason of this research objective is that the proposed error analysis method is important for 
the selection of devices and algorithms that will be used for safety performance monitoring. 
This research designed a preliminary error impact analysis testbed to model earthmoving 
workspaces, to apply different error rates of image-based technology, and to simulate 
safety-related violations, including speed limit violations, access violations to dangerous 
areas, and close proximity violations between heavy machinery in order to evaluate how 
the technology errors impact the safety monitoring performance. When enough safety 
monitoring data is available, safety planners can use these data to assess on-site safety 
performance of heavy equipment and better plan future activities from safety perspectives. 
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The scope of this research is limited to earthmoving and surface mining activities, 
more specifically, loading, hauling and dumping operations. In addition, this research only 
considered image-based devices and algorithms for data collection and data processing, 
and the error analysis model was designed for an image-based safety assessment for 
planning purposes. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between this research and other 
studies in the field. Most studies have focused on specific device and algorithm analysis 
and site implementation for safety risk identification. However, this research aims to 
propose an evaluation method during construction planning, explaining how different 
technologies impact the performance of safety risks identification. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
This paper is organized into five sections. After this introduction, Section 2 reviews 
image-based object identification and tracking studies used for safety applications. Section 
3 illustrates structures, elements, and detailed functions of the designed testbed and Section 
4 explains the test results. Section 5 finally concludes the article. 
 
2. Object Identification and Tracking for Construction Safety Improvement 
Many researchers have studied image-based object identification and tracking for 
construction safety applications. Chi et al. [5] proposed object tracking and path planning 
algorithms for safe equipment operation with automated crash avoidance features by using 
a high-frame-rate imaging camera called “Swiss Ranger 2 (SR-2)” developed by the Swiss 
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Center for Electronics and Microtechnology (CSEM).  The Swiss Ranger SR-2 has the 
following technical features: 124 (vertical) x 160 (horizontal) pixel resolution, 30 Hz 
maximum frame update rate, 7.5 m maximum reading distance based on time-of-flight 
principles, and 42◦ (horizontal) x 45◦ (vertical) field of view. Using the same device, 
Gonsalves and Teizer [6] segmented construction workers from a video sequence and then 
modeled and tagged them for their location tracking. They also proposed a modeling 
algorithm of the worker’s skeleton structure for human activity classification. However, 
these studies revealed limitations due to the short reading coverage and the noisy outdoor 
performance of the utilized device. Also, the methodology used depended highly on the 
accuracy of the segmentation algorithm. The object identification and tracking algorithms 
were poorly performed when objects in the scanned image were not correctly segmented 
with cluttered surrounding objects. Last, the object identification and classification 
algorithms required extensive object database with accurate 3D model features in order to 
represent all possible poses and actions of the objects. 
Some researchers used optical video cameras for monitoring and tracking objects. 
Chi and Caldas [7] investigated an exploratory object detection and classification method 
for mobile heavy equipment and workers. Yang et al. [8] proposed algorithms for tracking 
multiple workers from statically placed and dynamically moving cameras on construction 
sites. Quiñones-Rozo et al. [9] analysed image processing techniques to perform semi-
automated tracking of excavation activities. However, the challenges associated with 
gathering accurate 3D data created limitations when trying to model complex construction 
environment essential for safety monitoring. Such limitations can be minimized and 3D 
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scene is able to be reconstructed if multiple and overlapping image sources are combined; 
that is the concept of stereo vision cameras [10]. Stereo vision cameras find corresponding 
pixels from two images taken from different camera lenses using their correlation and 
likelihood to match. Once correspondence between two images is established, the distance 
information for 3D modeling can be obtained based on triangular principles, which 
consider geometrical relationship between camera and target positions.  
In construction, stereo vision cameras are expected to enhance situation awareness 
by facilitating tracking of construction equipment and materials and recognizing the event 
of safety hazards. Chi and Caldas [11] proposed an automated safety assessment method 
for earthmoving and surface mining activities using the stereo vision camera called 
“Bumblebee XB3” developed by Point Grey Research. The “Bumblebee XB3” is a three-
sensor multi-baseline (12cm and 24cm) stereo vision camera designed to offer both 3D 
spatial information and 1280 (horizontal) x 960 (vertical) maximum resolution within a 70° 
horizontal field of view. Its reliable maximum reading range is 75m with a measurement 
error rate of ±1m at 35m. The frame rate is 15 frames/sec. Chi and Caldas customized 
image processing algorithms and successfully identified and tracked on-site objects for 
spatial safety assessment. Nevertheless, visual recording devices had reduced performance 
in low-visibility and night-time environments, as well as in intense glare conditions. Also, 
the line-of-sight issue of the device sometimes deteriorated algorithm performance. 
In summary, the above discussion of existing image-based object identification and 
tracking devices and algorithms used for construction safety applications indicated that 
each device and algorithm has its own advantages and disadvantages. That is to say, every 
Automation in Construction 
 
 
7 
 
device and algorithm cannot be always perfect and suitable for a construction site since not 
only the device and the algorithm typically have measurement and processing errors but 
also construction operations and sites are unique and complex. Thus, different devices and 
algorithms need to be applied for different site conditions to optimize safety monitoring 
performance. The error impact analysis testbed presented in this paper would evaluate the 
impact of object identification and tracking errors on data collected and processed for 
spatial safety assessment and explain acceptable errors for device and algorithm selection. 
 
3. Design of an Error Impact Analysis Testbed 
A prototype testbed was designed for error impact analysis. The testbed first 
models virtual workspaces for earthmoving and surface mining activities and then 
simulates operations and related safety violations, such as speed limit violations, access 
violations to dangerous areas, and close proximity violations between heavy machinery. 
The testbed also models different object identification and tracking errors caused by 
image-based algorithms and devices as well as safety rules to detect safety risks. This 
testbed investigates the impact of errors on the performance of safety risk identification. 
This section will discuss the structure, the elements, and the functions of the testbed. 
 
3.1 Testbed structure 
The overview of the testbed structure is illustrated in Figure 2. Using spatial 
information of actual sites, a user can input a site map, relevant safety features such as an 
access-prohibited area or a safe material-loading area, heavy equipment types involved, 
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trajectory information of moving equipment, strategic camera positions, speed limits, and 
gross operating weights of the equipment into the testbed for safety violation detection. 
The testbed applies different object identification and tracking errors and then executes a 
simulation several times for each error rate. In a detailed explanation, 13 different error 
rates (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, and 30%) are used for sensitivity analyses of 
both object tracking and identification accuracies. To apply different error rates to the 
original data, a random number generator is used. If a simulation is implemented 100 times 
for each error rate, the testbed eventually runs the simulation 1,300 times for analyzing the 
impact of either tracking or identification accuracy. The testbed then outputs summary 
images and movie files. The testbed also summarizes safety-related violations using safety 
rules identified and analyzes performance. 
 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
 
The testbed codes were written using the C++ programming language in Microsoft 
Visual C++ 6.0. Intel Open Source Computer Vision Library (OpenCV) [12] was 
employed for image and video processing. A laptop computer (2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo 
CPU and 1.98 GB of RAM) was used for testbed implementation. The testbed details will 
be discussed in remaining sections. 
 
3.2 Testbed design: Input data 
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A user can first select a JPEG-format site map and then use two software tools: an 
area selection tool and a trajectory build tool. The area selection tool was designed to 
determine a dangerous access area, a discriminated access area such as a material stockpile, 
or a safe material-loading area. Here, a material stockpile allows a loader to access it for 
material scooping and a safety material-loading area allows close proximity between a 
loader and a truck for material loading. This tool first assists a user to plot a desired area 
using a computer mouse and input an area name, and the tool then generates a text file 
representing map specifications. Figure 3(a) shows a resulted text file of the tool. Once the 
user plots one location (a pixel of the map), the row and column values of the pixel are 
written into the text file. “DAA” represents a dangerous access area. “MP” stands for a 
material pile and “SLA” means a safe loading area. Figure 3(b) shows a map with specified 
areas. In Figure 3, a highwall area was assigned as a dangerous access area, a material 
stockpile and an unstable ground area were determined as discriminated access areas, and a 
safe material-loading area was designated. The current area selection tool, however, does 
not allow the user to specify circular zones such as crane operation proximity. A user can 
also determine strategic camera positions as shown in Figure 3(b). In this model, the user 
located three camera positions for monitoring. 
 
< Insert Figure 3 here > 
 
Following the design of that model, the trajectory build tool was developed to 
simulate the trajectories of heavy machinery. A user first enters the name of heavy 
Automation in Construction 
 
 
10 
 
equipment tracked. The users then plot each vehicle’s moving trajectory on the map and 
the tool generates a text file with x and y values of the plotted trajectory in meters. In other 
words, whenever the user plots one pixel of the map, the pixel’s row and column values 
are transformed to the global x and y values (meters from the top left corner) based on the 
scale of the map. The center point of an object’s height, the z value, is predetermined based 
on the equipment type. Here, the x, y, and z values represent volume centroid of the 
equipment in meters. For instance, if two trucks and one loader are involved in the 
operation, the user first enters T1 as the equipment name and keeps plotting the trajectory 
of T1. The tool then generates a text file with many lines such as “T1, 58.05, 75.26, 1.50,” 
which means the volume centroid of T1 (Truck 1) located at (58.05m, 75.26m, 1.50m). 
The user then continues inputting trajectories of T2 (Truck 2) and L1 (Loader 1). The 
detailed coordinate conversion equations are described below: 
 
                          when x > 0,                                                                                                   
                                    X = P +  �x2 + y2 × cos(tan−1 �y
x
� −  θ) 
                                    Y = Q +  �x2 + y2 × sin(tan−1 �y
x
� −  θ) 
              when x < 0,                                                                                                   
                                    X = P +  �x2 + y2 × cos(π
2
−  θ +  tan−1 �x
y
�) 
                                    Y = Q +  �x2 + y2 × sin(π
2
−  θ +  tan−1 �x
y
�)          (Eq. 1) 
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where, x and y represent the local horizontal and vertical positions. P and Q 
represent x and y positions of the camera. θ represents the rotation angle between the local 
reference frame and the global reference frame. X and Y represent converted global 
positions in meters. 
A user is then able to integrate a number of text files to create a virtual operation 
scenario. Figure 4(a) shows an integrated text file. By adding time information at the end 
of each line, only one vehicle appears at some time frames, but several vehicles appear 
simultaneously in some frames. For example, at 93 seconds (the first line in Figure 4(a)), 
only one truck (T1) appeared on the image. However, at 110 seconds (the last line in 
Figure 4(a)), two trucks (T1 and T2) appeared simultaneously. These combined trajectories 
construct a virtual test scenario. However, at this preliminary research stage, the time 
information was manually added by considering the map scale and the expected moving 
speed of heavy machinery. 
Figure 4(b) illustrates an example of a final simulation model with trajectory 
information. In this model, seven trucks and one loader were involved to simulate a 
loading operation. 
 
< Insert Figure 4 here > 
 
In summary, two software tools, the area selection tool and the trajectory build tool, 
generate text files describing safety-related area information and heavy machinery 
movement information. These files are then inputted to the testbed for constructing test 
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scenarios. As shown in Figure 2, there are two more input variables. One is the speed limit 
of the site, which is used for monitoring speed limit violations. The other is gross operating 
weights of heavy equipment, which determines a stopping distance for monitoring a 
proximity violation. In this example, the speed limit was set as 20 mph (8.94 m/s). The 
truck’s gross weight was set between 140,000 and 250,000lbs (63,503 and 113,398 kg), 
and the loader’s weight was set between 36,000 and 70,000lbs (16,329 and 31,751 kg) 
[13]. 
 
3.3 Testbed design: Internal processing 
Once safety-related area information and heavy machinery movement information 
construct test scenarios, the testbed runs a random error generator to modify original 
trajectory and classification information of heavy machinery with different tracking and 
identification errors. Pseudo-random number generators in the C++ programming language 
were utilized for error generation because they satisfied tests for randomness (e.g. uniform 
distribution, no apparent patterns). Again, the user can plot several sequential points to 
construct the trajectory of the heavy machinery involved. Each plotted point includes three 
different types of information: a heavy machinery type, the distance information of the 
point from the camera position, and the time information when the machinery locates at the 
point. As detailed explanation, a random tracking error generator first transforms the global 
x, y, and z values to the local coordinate using the designated camera position and the 
coordinate conversion matrix. The error generator then applies zero to 30% different 
tracking error rates to the local x, y, and z values and the revised values by the error are 
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finally transformed back to the global frame. A random identification error generator 
similarly applies different identification error rates to heavy machinery information and 
modifies the original classification of the machinery.  
As an example, if the original x, y, and z values were 136.6m, 130.4m, and 1.5m, 
these global values were transformed to -30.8m, 4.7m, and 1.5m local values using the 
conversion matrix and the camera location. 10% tracking error (90% tracking accuracy) 
randomly changed the local x, y, and z values to values between -33.88m and -27.72m for 
the x value, 4.23m and 5.17m for the y value, and 1.35m and 1.65m for the z value. 
Similarly, a 20% tracking error rate (80% tracking accuracy) randomly changed local x, y, 
and z values to values between -36.96m and -24.64m for the x value, 3.76m and 5.64m for 
the y value, and 1.2m and 1.8m for the z value. If a 20% identification error rate (80% 
identification accuracy) was applied, an actual truck was identified as a loader once out of 
five trials on the average. These local values were finally transformed back to the global 
values once the random error rate was applied. 
The testbed also applies safety rules on the revised trajectory and classification 
information to detect safety-related violations including speed limit, dangerous access, and 
proximity violations. Objects’ speed information can be obtained from the developed 
trajectory of heavy machinery by comparing different positions in sequential frames. The 
dangerous and strategic areas allocated by the area selection tool can be used to determine 
dangerous access violations. 
The first safety rule for speed limit violation detection was determined as “a speed 
limit violation occurs when moving speed of the tracked object exceeds its speed limit.” 
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This straightforward rule keeps monitoring the movement of on-site workers and heavy 
equipment and monitors violations. Similarly, the safety rule for dangerous access 
violation detection was designated as “a dangerous access violation occurs when the 
tracked object enters pre-determined prohibited areas.” The safety rule first marks 
dangerous or strategic areas and then monitors objects’ proximity to the areas. In 
earthmoving and surface mining activities, the dangerous areas include specified hazard 
areas, areas near highwalls, trenches, holes, cracked ground, road edges for haulage trucks, 
dumping edges (berms) for dump trucks and unstable material piles. Besides the dangerous 
areas, a strategic area needs to be considered for more effective safety assessment. It 
contains a material stockpile in which an access is authorized only for a loader performing 
material scooping and a loading area in which close proximity is allowed when a loader 
approaches a truck for material loading. Last, the safety rule for close proximity violation 
detection was determined as “a close proximity violation occurs when proximity between 
objects are smaller than their stopping distances.” The testbed, however, was flexibly 
designed to adapt and adjust different safety rules. 
Last, the testbed considers a different time tolerance for safety violation detection. 
The testbed applies nine different time intervals from zero seconds to five seconds (0, 0.5, 
1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 seconds) and evaluates how the number of false alarms 
decreases with different time tolerance. More specifically, the zero-second time interval 
means frame-by-frame analysis. In other words, the testbed detects safety violations frame 
by frame. However, the five-second interval detects a violation if the violation has been 
continuously monitored during five seconds. Thus, such consideration would be expected 
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to decrease the number of false alarms and increase the testbed efficiency by filtering noise 
out for practical testbed utilization. 
 
3.4 Testbed design: Output data 
The testbed basically outputs the final trajectory image affected by different data 
errors (Figure 5(a)) and a movie file showing actual operations, movements of heavy 
machinery, and safety violations. The testbed also creates temperature-based frequency 
information of the tracked trajectory (Figure 5(b)). A trajectory of heavy machinery was 
colored from blue to red (blue, yellow, orange, and red) based on visiting frequency. A 
highly-visited area such as a main haulage road and a loading area became close to red and 
a lowly-visited area became close to blue. This information helps a user identify congested 
(high density) areas and free spaces for safety planning. 
 
< Insert Figure 5 here > 
 
The testbed then estimates and counts safety-related violations based on safety 
rules, including speed limit violations, access violations to dangerous areas, and proximity 
violations between heavy pieces of machinery. First of all, the testbed monitors a speed 
limit violation. The speed limit violation occurs when the vehicle’s moving speed exceeds 
the predetermined speed limit. The testbed first counts the number of original speed limit 
violations with zero identification and tracking errors. Using this number, the testbed also 
counts the number of false alarms on speed violations and the number of missed original 
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violations due to object identification and tracking errors. Also, the testbed calculates an 
average speed of each vehicle. Theoretically, the worse an object’s tracking accuracy is, 
the more speed violations are expected to occur. Object identification accuracy would 
increase the speed violations only when different speed limits are assigned for different 
equipment types. By counting the number of vehicles that appeared in the images, the 
testbed calculates the probability of false violation occurrence per each vehicle’s 
appearance versus object identification and tracking errors.  
Second, the testbed monitors a violation of access to a dangerous area. The access 
violation occurs when the vehicle enters a prohibited access area. The testbed first counts 
the number of original access limit violations with zero identification and tracking errors. 
Using this number, the testbed also counts the number of false alarms on access violations 
and the number of missed original violations due to object identification and tracking 
errors. By counting the number of vehicles appearing in images, the testbed calculates the 
probability of false dangerous access violation occurrence per each vehicle’s appearance 
versus object identification and tracking errors. Theoretically, when tracking errors become 
more prevalent, heavy machinery tends to break away from its original trajectory more; 
that is to say, if a large size of a dangerous area is designated near the original trajectory, 
the number of dangerous access violations is expected to increase. Object identification 
would affect the monitoring results only when different access authorities are assigned to 
different object types. For examples, a material stockpile is able to be allowed only for a 
loader to access, but not for a truck. The testbed also estimates the occupancy % of 
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dangerous areas (dangerous areas in pixels / total areas in pixels) since this number may 
provide clues for the increments of access violations.  
Third, the testbed monitors a proximity violation between heavy machinery. The 
proximity violation occurs when the distance between pieces of machinery is smaller than 
its stopping distance. The stopping distance is estimated by considering the vehicle’s gross 
operating weight, its moving speed, and its motion direction. The testbed first counts the 
number of original proximity violations with zero identification and tracking errors. Using 
this number, the testbed also counts the number of false alarms on proximity violations and 
the number of missed original violations due to object identification and tracking errors. 
By counting the number of encounters between vehicles on images, the testbed calculates 
the probability of false close proximity violation occurrence per each vehicle’s encounter 
versus object identification and tracking errors. Theoretically, while the tracking accuracy 
is getting worse, the vehicle’s speed tends to increase and the stopping distance becomes 
larger. Thus, more proximity violations are expected. The object identification accuracy 
would affect proximity violations as well. If a loader is identified as a heavy truck, the 
gross weight increases and the stopping distance increases as a result. However, if a heavy 
truck is identified as a loader, the weight decreases and the stopping distance also 
decreases. 
Using the derived number of safety violations, the testbed finally estimates 
accuracy, the false alarm rate, and the missing detection rate of the testbed. The false 
alarms occur when no actual violation occurred, but the testbed detected false violations. 
The missing detections occur when actual violations occurred, but the testbed failed to 
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detect these violations. With the number of actual violations, if the testbed detects them as 
violations, then it is called a true positive (TP). However, if the testbed misses them, then it 
is called a false negative (FN), which represents missed violation detections. Similarly, if 
the testbed correctly rejects non-violated status, then it is called a true negative (TN). 
However, if the testbed detects them as violations, then it is called a false positive (FP), 
which represents false alarms. The violation detection accuracy, the false alarm rate, and 
the missing detection rate can be calculated by considering (1) TP and TN, (2) FP, and (3) 
FN, respectively. 
 
4. Test Results and Discussion 
4.1 Setup for testbed implementation 
The testbed aims at investigation of the impact of object identification and tracking 
errors caused by algorithms and devices on the data that was collected and processed for 
image-based safety violation detection. The testbed enables a user (a safety planner) to 
model virtual workspaces and simulate operations and related safety violations. Three 
different scenarios (two loading and one hauling scenarios) were constructed based on the 
ground truth that was actually monitored. The ground truth was built from the M. E. Ruby, 
Jr., limestone quarry located in Cedar Park, Texas, where 1.5 million tons of materials are 
produced every year. At this quarry, limestone is loaded from the quarry, hauled away, and 
dumped into the crusher. The crushed limestone is then loaded onto conveyor trucks for 
commercial delivery. 
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The testbed applied different object identification and tracking errors between 0% 
and 30% and executed a simulation 100 times for each error. Since a simulation was 
implemented 100 times for each error rate, the testbed eventually ran a simulation 1,300 
times for analyzing the impact of either tracking or identification accuracy. For the 
stopping distance calculation, 1 second driver’s perception and reaction time, 3% actual 
downgrade, 2% rolling resistance, 2 seconds brake system response time for trucks, 1 
second brake system response time for loaders, and 0.65 friction coefficient for quarry pit 
were utilized. 
 
4.2 Case Studies 
Test scenario 1 
The first scenario was constructed to represent a loading operation. Seven trucks 
and one loader were involved in the operation. The loader scooped materials from the 
assigned material stockpile and loaded materials onto the delivery trucks. The size of the 
original map was 811 (width) × 538 (height) with 436,319 pixels. A total of 1,591 images 
were processed; that is, a total of 2,068,300 images were processed through the 1,300-
times simulations. A dangerous access area “DAA1” was predetermined near highwalls 
and “DAA2” was designated for unstable ground. A material pile (MP1) was also located, 
which was a dangerous access area only for a truck, not for a loader. A total of 94,988 
pixels belonged to the dangerous areas, so the occupancy of the dangerous areas was 
21.77%. Last, a safe loading area (SLA1) was assigned near the material stockpile. Three 
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cameras were positioned for monitoring. The previous Figure 4(b) shows the result images 
of Scenario 1. 
 
 
Test scenario 2 
The second scenario was built to represent another loading operation. Seven trucks 
and two loaders were involved in the operation. The size of the original map was 855 
(width) × 493 (height) with 421,515 pixels. A total of 1,542 images were processed; that is, 
a total of 2,004,600 images were processed through the 1,300-times simulations. A 
dangerous access area “DAA1” was assigned near the material crusher, and “DAA2” was 
designated for unstable ground. Material piles (MP1, MP2, MP3, and MP4) were also 
located, which were the dangerous access areas only for a truck, not for a loader. Total of 
130,457 pixels belonged to the dangerous areas, so the occupancy of the dangerous areas 
was 30.95%. Six cameras were positioned for monitoring. Figure 6(a) shows result images 
of Scenario 2. 
 
< Insert Figure 6 here > 
 
Test scenario 3 
The third scenario was constructed to represent a hauling operation. Fourteen 
trucks were involved in the operation. The trucks traveled to the quarry entrance and 
traveled back to the exit. The size of the original map was 1,114 (width) × 587 (height) 
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with 653,918 pixels. A total of 1,407 images were processed; that is, a total of 1,829,100 
images were processed through the 1,500-times simulations. Dangerous access areas 
(DAA1, DAA2, DAA3, and DAA4) were assigned near road edges and highwalls, and 
“DAA5” was designated for unstable ground. Total of 476,413 pixels belonged to the 
dangerous areas, so the occupancy of the dangerous areas was 72.85%. Six cameras were 
positioned for monitoring. Figure 6(b) shows result images of Scenario 3. 
 
4.3 Discussion of testbed design 
In order to review the testbed design, interviews were conducted with eight 
industrial safety experts. Interviewees were selected from various construction domains 
including a general contractor, a sub-contractor (an excavating company), and a 
government agency (Department of Transportation). Industrial experience of the 
interviewees varied from minimum 6 years to maximum 37 years (21 years on the 
average). Positions of the interviewees included a vice president, a project manager, a field 
supervisor, a safety director, and a construction manager. The interview questionnaire was 
prepared to listen to expert’s opinions on input, internal processing, and output of the 
testbed design. 
The testbed inputs a site map, access-prohibited areas, material stockpiles, loading 
areas, and specification and actual trajectory information of earthmoving equipment 
involved in the operations in order to simulate virtual earthmoving scenarios. The first 
question asked rationality of these testbed input data. The question asked if an expert was 
able to understand designed workspaces and operations from the testbed input figure. All 
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interviewees were comfortable with designed scenarios and agreed that the scenarios 
would assist safety planners to design workspaces and to understand working environment 
efficiently. They even recommended that those scenarios would be helpful not only to 
analyze safety risks but also improve overall operations, productivity and performance of 
employee education in traffic flow areas. 
The second and the third questions asked reliability of the testbed internal 
processing. The testbed applies different positioning errors caused by position tracking 
devices and algorithms. The interviewee agreed that the deteriorated trajectory information 
will impact the performance of safety risk detection such as speed limit violations, 
dangerous accesses, and close proximity. They agreed that applying different error rates to 
the trajectory information and analyzing the impact of the error are necessary to conduct 
safety assessment process. They trusted that higher tracking errors would result in higher 
risk of safety performance. 
The fourth and the fifth questions asked usefulness of the testbed output. The 
testbed analyzes how different errors related to the use of different technologies impact the 
violation detection performance. The questions provided a simple utilization example with 
different device and algorithm combinations. All interviewees agreed that the impact 
analysis of the testbed is useful to assist safety planners to select applicable devices and 
methods for safety assessment on the site. Most of the interviewees were comfortable to 
use device and algorithm combinations with higher level of accuracy than 90%. Thus, it 
could be an acceptable level of violation detection accuracy which can be utilized as 
reference values for device and algorithm selection processes. 
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4.4 Sensitivity analysis of testbed results 
Sensitivity of the testbed performance to tracking accuracy 
Each scenario ran 100 times to derive an analysis of the sensitivity of the testbed 
performance to different tracking error rates, ranging from 0% to 30%. In order to estimate 
accuracy, false alarm rates, and missing detection rates, each scenario originally had 
simulated violations. In Scenario 1, the original simulation with the zero tracking error rate 
resulted in zero speed limit violations, three dangerous access violations, and 14 close 
proximity violations. In Scenario 2, the original simulation resulted in zero speed limit, 
two dangerous access, and 16 close proximity violations. In Scenario 3, the original 
simulation resulted in two speed limit, zero dangerous access, and 15 close proximity 
violations.  
Mean (%) and standard deviation (%) with 95% confidence interval were estimated 
for safety violation detection accuracy by considering the number of true positives (TP) 
and true negatives (TN), false alarm rate by considering false positives (FP), and missing 
detection rate by considering false negatives (FN) versus different tracking errors. The 
mean of violation detection accuracy decreased from 100% to 80.87% on the average of 
100-times simulations in Scenario 1, to 69.88% in Scenario 2, and to 60.50% in Scenario 
3, respectively to increasing tracking errors. The mean of false alarm rate increased from 
0% to 19.11% in Scenario 1, to 30.07% in Scenario 2, and to 39.39% in Scenario 3. The 
mean of missing detection rate increased from 0% to 0.024% on the average of 100-times 
simulations in Scenario 1, to 0.05% in Scenario 2, and to 0.11% in Scenario 3. Figure 7(a) 
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illustrates how tracking errors impacted the performance of safety violation detection. The 
testbed results indicated that the violation detection accuracy was decreased by increasing 
tracking errors with the short range of standard deviations (Figure 7(b)). 
 
< Insert Figure 7 here > 
 
The analysis results were also plotted in the Receiver Operating Characteristics 
(ROC) space to visualize and analyze how the safety assessment performance was affected 
by increasing tracking error rates (Figure 8). As shown in Figure 8, the False Positive Rate 
(FPR, FP/(FP+TN)) was more sensitive to the increasing error rates than the True Positive 
Rate (TPR, TP/(TP+FN)) did. In other words, the increasing error rates significantly 
produced the increased number of false alarms and the safety assessment accuracy was 
decreased respectively. 
 
< Insert Figure 8 here > 
 
Discussion of the false alarm rate 
The testbed results indicated that the violation detection accuracy was affected 
significantly by the number of false alarms, not by the missing rate; the missing rate only 
increased to up to less than 0.2%. As mentioned in the previous section, the false alarms 
occur when no actual violation occurred, but the testbed detected false violations. The 
missing detections occur when actual violations occurred, but the testbed failed to detect 
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these violations. Even though a low rate of the tracking error resulted in the lower false 
alarm rate, even 1% false alarm rate becomes annoying workers for practical use of the 
testbed. As detailed explanation, the processing speed of the safety violation detection 
method was about three frames per second. That is to say, more than 10,000 images can be 
processed in an hour. If a false alarm rate is 1%, about 100 false alarms are generated by 
the method in an hour and they may be just ignored by the workers as nuisance noise. 
Therefore, we need to consider the way to minimize the number of false alarms generated 
by the testbed. 
The designed testbed evaluates safety violations frame by frame, which resulted in 
the high rate of false alarms. With the consideration of a different time tolerance for safety 
violation detection, such false alarms are expected to decrease. That is to say, when a 
safety violation is continuously monitored during a certain time interval (ex. three seconds) 
the testbed identifies this case as a violation, not by the frame-by-frame approach. The 
testbed applied nine different time intervals from zero seconds to five seconds (0, 0.5, 1.0, 
1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 seconds) and monitored how the number of false alarms 
decreased with different time tolerance. 
Table 1 summarizes the relationship between the false alarm rates and the different 
time interval for safety violation detection. A different time interval was applied for each 
tracking error rate (0%, 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, 14%, 16%, 18%, 20%, 25%, and 
30%). As shown in the table, the longer time interval was, the more the false alarm rate 
decreased.  
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< Insert Table 1 here> 
 
As an application example, since an access violation and a proximity violation are 
able to cause sudden accidents, a one-second time interval could be selected for violation 
assessment. A speed limit violation may be less harmful than the other two violations, and 
the three-second time interval could be determined for violation detection. In the case of 
Scenario 3, 18 false speed-limit violations, one false access violation, and seven false 
proximity violations were original monitored with the 2% tracking error rate using the 
frame-by-frame assessment method. However, the false speed-limit violations decreased 
up to two with the three-second interval, and the false access violation was eliminated and 
the false proximity violations decreased up to two with the one-second time interval. 
 
Sensitivity of the testbed performance to identification accuracy 
In addition to the results against tracking errors, the testbed evaluated the violation 
detection performance against identification errors. The testbed results showed that, 
however, the detection accuracy was not that affected by the identification errors. 
Regardless of different identification errors, the accuracy was higher than 99.5%. That was 
because the identification error did not change the original trajectory of heavy machinery, 
so no false speed limit violation occurred and just few false access and proximity 
violations were generated. However, the number of false access violations increased 
proportionally to the number of loader accesses to material stockpiles for material scooping 
and similarly the number of false proximity violations was increased by the number of 
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close loader approaches to a truck for material loading. These numbers would help safety 
planners plan acceptable tolerance for safety assessment and false alarm generation. 
 
Utilization example 
Table 2 explains how these results can be utilized for actual device and algorithm 
evaluation. Let us imagine a safety planner set 90% accuracy as acceptable tolerance and 
evaluated several combinations of devices (A, B, and C) and algorithms (1 and 2) with 
different tracking errors. As shown in the table, the safety planner can determine both 
Device A and B are acceptable with Algorithm 1 for the site. However, the safety planner 
still needs to consider other factors such as familiarity, cost, and easiness to select one 
from two device candidates. 
 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
 
5. Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this research was to develop methods to evaluate data 
collection and data processing errors of image-based devices and algorithms used on safety 
performance monitoring of a specific earthmoving activity or project. This study designed 
and developed an error impact analysis testbed to model object identification and tracking 
errors caused by image-based devices and algorithms and to analyze the impact of the 
errors for spatial safety assessment of earthmoving operations. 
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Testbed results showed that the designed testbed met the research objectives. 
Interviews with industrial experts verified the rationality and usefulness of the testbed 
design. Case studies tested its performance for impact analysis of the data collection and 
processing errors. The testbed modeled three different earthmoving operation scenarios 
with several pieces of heavy machinery involved. The testbed placed cameras at the pre-
determined positions for monitoring, designated dangerous areas, and constructed the 
motion trajectory of heavy machinery plotted by the user. Using safety rules, the testbed 
detected the speed limit, dangerous access, and close proximity violations. The testbed also 
modeled different object identification and tracking errors caused by algorithms and 
devices, and evaluated the impact of these errors on the safety analyses.  
This research successfully provided safety monitoring data related to earthmoving 
and surface mining activities. When enough safety monitoring data is available, safety 
planners can use these data to assess on-site safety performance of heavy equipment and 
better plan future activities from safety perspectives. 
Nevertheless, there are still limitations, improvement opportunities, and future 
research challenges to be addressed. Future research should conduct a larger number of 
experiments for testbed utilization on actual construction sites, and consider more 
sophisticated earthmoving and surface mining scenarios with a large number of heavy 
equipment involved. The testbed needs to consider more specific vertical operating 
features such as crane operation and load bucket lift. Future research also would consider 
utilizing temperature-based frequency information for guiding haulage operators and 
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avoiding abnormal travel patterns of heavy equipment. The information can be used to 
differentiate a clouded area with an access-free area for safety planning. 
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Figure 1 Research scope 
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Figure 2 Overview of system structure 
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                          (a)                                                                (b) 
Figure 3 Area selection tool: (a) a text file for area selection, (b) a map with specified areas 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4 Trajectory build tool: (a) a combined text file, (b) a map with trajectory 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5 Testbed outputs: (a) final trajectory impacted by 10% tracking error, (b) 
temperature-based frequency information of the tracked trajectory 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6 Case studies: (a) the result image of Scenario 2, (b) the result image of Scenario 3 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7 Sensitivity of violation detection accuracy versus tracking errors: (a) violation 
detection accuracy, (b) standard deviations 
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(c) 
Figure 8 Plots in the ROC space by increasing tracking errors: (a) Scenario 1, (b) Scenario 
2, and (c) Scenario 3 
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Table 1 False alarm rate and different time tolerance for safety violation detection 
Fa
ls
e 
A
la
rm
 R
at
e 
(%
) 
Scenario Time Interval 
(sec) 
Tracking Error Rate (%) 
0% 6% 10% 20% 30% 
1 0 0 3.09 6.67 14.02 19.34 
1 0 0.55 1.40 3.73 5.36 
2 0 0.31 0.74 1.80 2.73 
3 0 0.20 0.40 0.89 1.53 
4 0 0.15 0.23 0.50 0.97 
5 0 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.66 
2 0 0 5.20 12.18 24.44 29.45 
1 0 0.96 2.94 6.70 8.24 
2 0 0.62 1.50 3.29 4.15 
3 0 0.40 0.73 1.75 2.37 
4 0 0.27 0.42 1.05 1.53 
5 0 0.20 0.27 0.68 1.06 
3 0 0 4.70 12.66 28.89 38.44 
1 0 0.79 2.91 8.67 11.64 
2 0 0.46 1.51 4.09 5.77 
3 0 0.28 0.73 1.95 3.15 
4 0 0.19 0.38 1.02 1.90 
5 0 0.16 0.23 0.59 1.23 
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Table 2 Preliminary utilization example of the testbed results 
 
Device Algorithm Tracking 
Error 
Violation Detection Accuracy (%) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
A 1 6% 97.3 94.8 95.0 
B 1 8% 95.5 91.4 91.0 
C 1 10% 93.8 87.7 86.8 
A 2 12% 92.2 84.5 82.8 
B 2 14% 90.6 81.6 79.1 
 
